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Inter-firm technology transfer:
partnership-embedded licensing or
standard licensing agreements?
John Hagedoorn, Stefanie Lorenz-Orlean and Hans van Kranenburg
When companies decide to engage in technology transfer through exclusive
licensing to other firms, they have two basic options: to use standard licensing
contracts or to set-up more elaborate partnership-embedded licensing agree-
ments. We find that broader partnership-embedded licensing agreements are
preferred with higher levels of technological sophistication of industries, with
greater perceived effectiveness of secrecy as a means of appropriability, and when
licensors are smaller than their licensees. Innovative differential between
companies, innovative supremacy of the licensor and market and technological
overlap between partners appear to have no effect on the preference for a
particular form of licensing.
1. Introduction
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first attempt to analyse the preference
of companies for either standard licensing agreements or broader partnership-
embedded licensing agreements as they engage in technology transfer with other
companies. When companies enter into a licensing agreement, they are subject to a
contract or an agreement that regulates the transfer of technology, in which they, as
legal entities, give permission or the “right” to another legal entity, such as a
company, to manufacture a product or use a service, with the objective of achieving
commercial gain, in return for a fee to be paid by the licensee to the licensor. We
understand a partnership-embedded licensing agreement to refer to those
agreements where companies engage in technology transfer through a licensing
agreement that is implanted in a broader agreement, a partnership, which also has
other objectives than the single act of transferring technology from one company to
the other. In that context, companies combine licensed technology transfer with the
sharing of resources or even assets related to any element of the value chain, such as
joint R&D, manufacturing, supply, and marketing.
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Obviously, companies face a set of completely different issues when they engage
in a standard licensing agreement or when they decide to make the licensing
agreement part of a broader partnership. In this article, we will consider a number of
industry-specific conditions and pair and company-specific settings that we expect to
be relevant in explaining under which circumstances firms might opt for technology
transfer through either a standard license or a partnership-embedded licensing
agreement. The main contingencies that we explore in this study refer to the level of
technological sophistication of industries, the regime of appropriability with which
companies are confronted, and the inter-firm differences between licensing partners
in terms of their size, their innovativeness, their technological bases, and their
product markets.
We study a sample of nearly 230 licensing agreements made between US com-
panies in various industries during the 1990s. About 70% of these licensing agree-
ments refer to partnership-embedded licensing, the other 30% are standard licensing
contracts. All these licensing agreements are exclusive licenses, restricted to a specific
user, a geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific field of use. Most
of the agreements are found in a small range of industries such as chemicals,
instruments, and electrical and electronic equipment.
2. Hypotheses
The literatures on partnerships (e.g., Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Hagedoorn,
2002; Casciaro, 2003) and licensing (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kim, 2005; Kim
and Vonortas, 2006) both suggest that the preferences that companies might have for
particular organizational modes and the architecture of inter-firm arrangements in
the context of technology sharing depends on both environmental conditions, i.e.,
industry-specific conditions, and partnership and firm-specific conditions. Following
these partnership and licensing literatures, we will discuss a set of hypotheses that
stipulate the environmental as well as the firm and partnership conditions that might
shape the preferences that companies have for standard licensing contracts or
partnership-embedded licensing agreements.
When considering contributions that are relevant in the context of understanding
the industry conditions that affect technology transfer through standard licensing
contracts or partnership-embedded licensing, it becomes clear that the past two
decades of empirical research have already generated a substantial body of literature
on partnership formation while licensing has clearly attracted somewhat less
attention. A relatively large number of contributions (see amongst others
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Dussauge and Garette, 1999; Oster, 1999;
Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Hagedoorn, 2002) indicates that the growth in the
number of inter-firm partnerships, where companies share resources and assets, is
generally associated with so-called high-tech industries. In these high-tech industries,
the competitive landscape of companies is determined by technological competences,
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R&D activities, learning and flexibility in terms of organization, and innovative
output. Partnerships enable companies to learn with and from their partners in a
flexible setting where many of the leading companies engage in a multitude of
partnerships with different partners. Although partnerships are popular in a large
number of industries and they are indeed established in all sectors, across the
spectrum from dynamic high-tech industries to more static and technologically less
advanced sectors, there is evidence that partnerships are more widespread in high-
tech industries. Research by amongst others Dussauge and Garette (1999) and
Hagedoorn (2002) indicates that a disproportionate share of these partnerships are
made in a limited number of R&D intensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals,
electronics, and information technology industries.
Most standard licensing agreements are found to be restricted to single technology
transfer, few of them are part of a multiple technology transfer exercise (Anand and
Khanna, 2000). Based on a theoretical contribution, Arora and Fosfuri (2003) expect
that in industries characterized by homogeneous markets with little product
differentiation, companies have a higher preference for licensing; whereas, this
preference for licensing decreases in industries where product differentiation is
crucial for the competitive positioning of companies.
The above suggests that we can expect some relevant industry differences with
regard to the preference that companies have for licensed technology transfer that is
either part of a broader arrangement through a partnership or a standard licensing
agreement. Given the experience that many companies in technologically sophisti-
cated sectors have with a range of partnerships, we can expect companies in these
sectors to routinely consider partnerships as one of the first options, if not the first
option, for any act of inter-firm collaboration, including licensing. In addition, the
complexity of technologies and the complementarity of innovative inputs in these
industries will require intensive collaboration for technology transfer (Hagedoorn,
2002). Both, the prolificy of partnerships and the nature of complex technology
transfer, will stimulate companies in technologically sophisticated industries to think
of a combination of partnerships and licensing as a first option when they engage in
technology transfer with other companies. Partnerships are less “popular” in
technologically less sophisticated industries but in these industries standard licenses
are a very well-known mechanism for the single transfer of straightforward
technologies. Hence, we expect that companies in technologically less sophisticated
industries have a disproportionate preference for standard licensing agreements.
H1: The higher the level of technological sophistication of industries, the
higher the likelihood that companies prefer partnership-embedded licensing
to standard licensing contracts.
So far, there is little research on the possible effect that the degree to which
companies can protect their technology might have on their preference for either
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partnership-embedded licensing or standard licensing contracts. The empirical
analysis of Anand and Khanna (2000) suggests that generally in industries with
weaker regimes of appropriability, where patents are considered to offer little or no
effective protection, licensing is to be less preferred by companies as the licensee can
invent around the technology that is transferred (see also Kim and Vonortas, 2006,
for similar results). In these industries with weaker regimes of appropriability, Anand
and Khanna (2000) expect that broader inter-firm agreements, such as joint ventures,
are more likely to occur as this form of partnership offers companies the possibility
to monitor and control their technology transfer partners. They also state that
exclusive licensing, which limits technology transfer to a specific user, a geographic
region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific field of use, might be preferred
when companies operate in the context of a strong regime of appropriability and
their technology is well protected through patents.
However, in case the efficiency of the regime of appropriability and the
protection of technology in industries is based on secrecy and not on intellectual
property rights, the effect of the regime of appropriability might change. Cohen
et al. (2000) and Arundel (2001) mention that in a large number of industries
companies prefer to use secrecy to protect their technology. This suggests that in
industries where companies see secrecy as an efficient protection mechanism for
their technology, companies might also prefer partnership-embedded licensing
agreements to standard licensing contracts. Partnerships allow companies to
monitor and control the transfer of their technology in an inter-organizational
context, but this monitoring and control of the relationship also enables partners
to gradually build up a trusted relationship where confidentiality among partners
facilitates the transfer of technology (Gulati, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Chung et al., 2000;
Kale et al., 2000). As secrecy is perceived as an effective mechanism to protect
technology and control technology transfer by companies from a range of
industries, companies operating in such industries will probably see closer
collaboration through partnership-embedded licensing as more effective than
market-based, arms-length transactions through standard licensing contracts. In
addition, we can point at the role of tacitness in the transfer of technological
knowledge in industries where secrecy is an important protection mechanism for
innovative activities. Contributions by Braganza et al. (1999), Merges (2003), and
Torrisi (1998) indicate that industries where companies prefer secrecy to protect
their innovative activities are also those sectors where tacit knowledge plays
an important role in the transfer of technology. Standard licensing is based on a
high degree of transferable codified knowledge but partnership-embedded licensing
enables companies to go beyond the transfer of codified knowledge and
to communicate additional tacit knowledge in a broader set up of a partnership.
Also, as demonstrated by Martin and Salomon (2002) increasing levels of the
tacitness of knowledge to be transferred by companies to others, encourage them to
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prefer more organizationally complex partnerships to standard licensing contracts.
Hence:
H2: The stronger the regime of appropriability of industries, in terms of
the prevalence of companies for secrecy, the higher the likelihood that
companies will prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing
contracts.
Turning to a number of more firm-specific and partnership-specific dimensions
of the preference for standard licensing contracts or partnership-embedded licensing,
we shall now first consider the possible effect of the size differential of companies that
engage in technology transfer. In this context, we understand size to be an indicator
of the market power of a company that refers to its ability to benefit from and to
influence the actual process of technology transfer in a licensing agreement, be it of
an embedded or a non-embedded nature. As already well established in the industrial
organization literature, we expect the size of firms to be an important aspect of
market power as larger companies can reap benefits in terms of both economies of
scale and scope and bargaining power vis-a`-vis smaller firms (Bresnahan, 1989;
Cohen and Levin, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Malerba and
Orsonigo, 1997; Barla, 2000).
The literature points out that the size of companies participating in partnerships
and more in particular the size difference with their partners can play a role in the
risk perception of companies during the partnership formation process as well as
during the life span of the partnership (Berg et al., 1982; Mytelka, 1991). In general,
this literature suggests that this kind of asymmetry in partnerships generates higher
risks to the smaller firm. Thus, when companies of different size cooperate in
technology transfer, we assume that smaller licensors are running a greater risk of
losing control over their technology than larger firms that have more resources to
control and monitor their technology transfer. In case a large firm is the licensor to a
smaller licensee, it has the resources and organizational capabilities to monitor the
licensee. When the larger firm is the licensee, it also can use its resources and
organizational capabilities to monitor the agreement and it has no incentive to
engage in a more complex arrangement, such as a partnership-embedded licensing
agreement.
The literature on licensing does indeed indicate that when companies of different
firm size engage in technology licensing agreements, larger firms dominate the
agreement due to bargaining asymmetries that affect the terms of the licensing
agreement (Caves et al., 1983; Bessy and Brousseau, 1998). Research by Kolmer and
Dowling (2004) on licensing practices of large integrated companies and smaller
newly established firms in the bio-pharma industry demonstrates some major
differences in the licensing strategies of these companies. Large companies appear to
prefer to license less crucial technologies to others (see also Caves et al., 1983);
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whereas, smaller firms are forced by market conditions, to license technologies
related to their core products.
The above suggests not only some interesting differences between companies of
dissimilar size, it also implies that is important for smaller companies with valuable
technologies, when acting as licensors, to protect their technological competences
and to exercise as much control as possible over their technology transfer. This
implies that when smaller companies own valuable technologies that qualify them for
licensing to larger partners, these smaller licensors should prefer to set up
partnerships that act as broader agreements that enable them to monitor and
control technology transfer in broader partnerships than through standard licensing
contracts. Thus:
H3: In the context of firm size differentials, when licensors are smaller than
their licensees, licensors prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard
licensing contracts.
In a somewhat similar vein as with the size differential of firms, we can expect that
different innovative capabilities or differences in innovativeness of partners affect
their preference for particular forms of licensing. There is always a risk of technology
leakage in technology exchange between companies but when the licensor is more
advanced in its technological capabilities and it transfers technology to its less
developed partner, there is a serious risk of technology leakage as a by-product of the
licensing agreement that will upgrade the less developed partner beyond what was
intended. It is difficult for companies to make an exact assessment of alternative
applications and future uses of the technology that the licensee can exploit to
improve its innovative capabilities beyond the improvement stipulated in the
licensing agreement (Caves et al., 1983). Hill (1992) refers to this as the risk of
second-order diffusion when technological know-how that underlies the licensed
technology is “accidentally” transferred. This additional technology may enable the
licensee to innovate beyond the licensed technology and use this technology in other
products outside the range of the licensing agreement. Partnership-embedded
licensing, where companies collaborate on a broader project than the transfer of
technology itself, gives more options for a licensor to monitor both its partner and
the use of its transferred technology than in case of a standard licensing contract.
Hence, we expect that:
H4: In the context of innovative differentials between companies, when
licensors are more innovative than licensees, licensors prefer partnership-
embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.
The licensing agreements that are analysed in this article, both partnership-
embedded licensing agreements and standard licensing contracts, are restricted to
exclusive users, where the geographic regional use, the specific length of time of
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usage, and/or the specific field of use are specified in the agreement. This implies that
licensors have the option to control the use of their licensed technology by
companies that operate in similar product markets or that use a somewhat similar
technology base. However, no matter how specified licensing contracts are drafted,
they still contain some element of uncertainty. Therefore, even though licensing
agreements are clearly less relational than many other forms of inter-firm
cooperation, they are still to some degree incomplete contracts as not all
contingencies of future and broader use can be foreseen (Hill, 1992; Bessy and
Brousseau, 1998; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007).
When licensors enter into a technology transfer agreement with partners that are
direct competitors, in the sense that they operate in similar product markets or apply
similar technologies, they are expected to prefer to arrange this technology transfer
through a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. Again, the main motive for
this preference is that a partnership-embedded licensing agreement offers more
options for a licensor to monitor its partner and the technology transfer than a
standard licensing contract. Through partnership-embedded licensing it can avoid
second-order diffusion of technological know-how that might enable its partner,
with which there is overlap in markets and/or technologies, to use these unintended
spill-overs in new or improved products or to upgrade its technology. Hence:
H5: The larger the similarity of companies, in terms of market overlap (5a)
and technological overlap (5b), the higher the likelihood that companies will
prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.
3. Methodology
3.1 Sample and data collection
We test our hypotheses on a sample of licensing agreements taken from the Thomson
SDC database, using a binomial logit model (Limdep version 8.0). The sample
consists of 228 licensing agreements of which, 28.9% are standard licensing
agreements and 71.1% are embedded licensing agreements. Our research covers a 10
years period, from 1990 until the end of 1999.
There are some important features of our sample that have to be discussed briefly.
First, we restrict our analysis of licensing agreements, both the partnership-
embedded licensing agreements and the standard licensing contracts, to exclusive
licensing. Contrary to non-exclusive licenses which are usually unrestricted in terms
of users, geographic regions, length of time, and specific fields of use; exclusive
licensing agreements refer to specific partners where technology is transferred from
one company to another with restricted use. As such these exclusive licensing
agreements are expected to be of greater importance to both the licensor and the
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licensee then the common non-exclusive licensing agreement. Second, in order to
control for the effect of international technology transfer and to counter the effect of
the lack of data on non-US companies, we concentrate on licensing agreements made
within the domestic US context, i.e., agreements made between two US companies.
Third, given the legal ramifications of intellectual property rights and licensing,
certainly in an international context, this sample of US domestic licensing
agreements has the advantage that these agreements are subject to the same legal
system. Fourth, we only analyse agreements made between two companies; a small
number of agreements between three or more companies were deleted from our
sample. Fifth, due to the lack of some industry indicators for service industries and
given the abundance of licensing agreements in manufacturing industries, we only
include agreements for manufacturing sectors. Finally, but also critically, the
licensing agreements between the pairs of companies in this sample are unique and
first combinations of these companies. Based on the information found in the
Thomson SDC database, these partners did not engage in earlier licensing agreements
or other forms of cooperation with each other during a period of at least 5 years prior
to the licensing agreement in this sample. This implies that the preference for a
partnership-embedded licensing agreement or an exclusive licensing agreement is not
guided by previous or recent contacts between two companies that could be
interpreted as joint, routinized, and endogenous search behaviour. On the contrary,
the decision to enter into either form of licensing can be seen as a distinctive and
strategic decision, made in the context of a first time encounter between the two
companies involved in the technology transfer.1
To arrive at our sample, we first selected all agreements in the Thomson SDC
database that are flagged as licensing agreements and those agreements in which
technology transfer and licensing were mentioned in the textual description (deal
text). We only considered agreements labelled as completed/signed deals (status:
completed/signed). Using the textual description, we also verified whether the
Thomson identification of the licensor and licensee were accurate, similar to Anand
and Khanna (2000) we found that licensor and licensee are generally correctly
identified in the Thomson SDC database. Next, we selected only one-way licensing
agreements that are indicated as exclusive licensing agreements, excluding a large
number of cross-licensing agreements that are not flagged as such. Within the group
of exclusive licensing agreements, we distinguish between partnership-embedded
licensing and standard licensing agreements. A partnership-embedded licensing
agreement is a licensing agreement that is part of an R&D agreement, marketing
agreement, or manufacturing and supply agreement, the latter category contains
1Furthermore, during the period 1990–1999, only 16 pairs of companies, i.e., 7% of the sample, have
set up any form of subsequent collaboration registered in the Thomson SDC database after their
first agreement, of which only 1 pair entered into a third consecutive collaboration agreement with
each other.
536 J. Hagedoorn et al.
 at Universiteit M
aastricht on M
ay 3, 2010 
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
manufacturing, supply, and original equipment manufacturing/value-added reseller
agreements.2 As indicated in the above, we also only included exclusive licensing
agreements that pertain to a US context, implying that the participants are US firms
(participant ultimate parent nation code: US, cross border participants: no) and that
the licensing agreement refers to the US market (nation code of partnership contains
US) as one of the main markets.
Given the selection procedure, as described in the above, most agreements (58%)
are found in SIC 28 (chemicals and allied products), followed by 14% in SIC 38
(instruments and related products), and 8% in SIC 36 (electrical and electronic
equipment). The remaining agreements are spread over a diverse group of industries.
Major companies in the sample are Eli Lilly and Schering-Plough which are involved
in 10 licensing agreements each, followed by American Home Products and Bristol-
Myers Squibb, each with 7 licensing agreements.
3.2 Measures
The dependent variable, form of licensing agreement, refers to the preference for a
standard exclusive licensing contract or a partnership-embedded licensing agree-
ment. The dependent variable is coded 0 if the licensing agreement is a standard
exclusive licensing contract and 1 if it is a partnership-embedded exclusive licensing
agreement, i.e., when the licensing contract is part of a partnership that also covers
joint efforts of companies in R&D, manufacturing and supply or marketing.
Level of technological sophistication of an industry (Hypothesis 1) refers to the
R&D intensity of the sector in which a licensing agreement (either a standard
exclusive licensing or a partnership-embedded exclusive licensing agreement) is
found, as indicated by the Thomson SDC database. This measure accounts for the
degree to which firms in a particular industry dedicate resources to R&D. It is
measured as total R&D expenditures of companies as a percentage of total
production (gross output) in an industry. The data refer to US industries and R&D
intensity is reported as average of 1991–1997 (OECD, 2001). Conversion tables were
used to convert ISIC codes, in which the OECD R&D intensities are categorized, into
SIC codes used by Thomson SDC to categorize industries to which licensing agree-
ments refer. This industry R&D intensity indicates the extent to which companies in
particular industries devote resources to R&D that generate a continuous flow of
newly developed technologies, new products and new processes, representing
differences in the sectoral levels of technological sophistication (OECD, 1992, 2001,
2003; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Galan and Sanchez, 2006). As also stated by
2Our binary classification (standard licensing versus partnership-embedded licensing) is based on
the information found in the Thomson SDC database. Additional analyses with a more fine-grained
classification of partnership-embedded licensing agreements, using multinomial logit and ordered
logit analyses did not generate meaningful results.
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Hatzichronoglou (1997: 146), this “. . . R&D intensity largely reflects an industry’s
technological sophistication . . .”.
The regime of approproability of industries is measured as the level of perceived
effectiveness of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism in different US industries as
reported in Cohen et al. (2000). This indicates the degree to which companies in
different industries appreciate secrecy as an effective appropriability mechanism for
innovation (Hypothesis 2). Using a conversion table, we transformed ISIC codes, in
which the regimes of appropriability are reported, into the SIC codes to which both
forms of exclusive licensing are assigned in the Thomson SDC database.
Size differential of companies is based on the difference between the numbers of
employees for both companies engaged in an agreement (Barla, 2000; Hagedoorn
et al., 2005). It is calculated as the logarithmic difference between the number of
employees from the licensor and the licensee.3 Data for this variable were retrieved
from Compustat, CorpTech, Dun & Bradstreet’s Hoovers, Osiris, and Worldscope
and, in a small number of cases, annual reports. For both partners in an agreement,
we took employment data from 1 year before the agreement was established.
Innovative differential between licensing partners is measured through patent
intensity ratios. See Griliches (1998) for a discussion of patents as a useful indicator
of innovation. The patent intensity ratio is based on the total number of US patents
issued to companies during 5 years prior to the year when the agreement was
established. For each partner in an agreement, we calculated a patent intensity ratio,
controlling for firm size as measured by the number of employees. From these
individual ratios, we calculated the innovative differential as the difference in patent
intensity between the licensor and licensee (Hypothesis 4).4
Market overlap of companies is measured by primary 4-digits SIC code overlap
between licensor and licensee. Primary SIC codes of companies are reported in
the Thomson SDC database. Based on primary 4-digits SIC codes we computed a
market overlap dummy, which was set at 1 if the licensor and the licensee are in the
same market, as measured by primary 4-digits SIC code, and 0 if they are not
(Hypothesis 5a).5
Technological overlap is measured by a patent class overlap dummy
(Hypothesis 5b). This measure is based on the number of patent classes listed for
all US patent applications of both partners in an agreement, during a period of 5
years before a licensing agreement was established. The dummy is 1 if at least one full
3In additional analyses, we also measured the size differential in terms of the revenue difference at
the pair level. The statistical analysis with revenue-based size differential was performed with a
slightly smaller sample (N ¼ 211), due to missing values for at least one of the companies in 17 pairs
of our overall sample. This analysis led to similar results.
4We also used patent intensity ratios and average patent intensity in unreported statistical analyses,
this generated similar results.
5Measures for market overlap in 2- and 3-digits SIC codes generated similar results.
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patent class (nine digits) is the same and 0 if there is no patent class overlap.6 These
data were retrieved from the US Patent and Trademark Office.
We also included a number of control variables. A trend variable time is included
to control for possible growth in the number of agreements (see e.g., Gulati, 1999)
and a gradual change in the distribution between partnership-embedded licensing
and exclusive licensing agreements. This trend variable was calculated by assigning a
value to each particular year, which reflects the distance to the first year of the period
under investigation.
The average experience is the log of the count of the total number of licensing
agreements accumulated by each pair of companies during a period of 5 years before
the agreement (see e.g., Gulati, 1999). This experience refers to all forms of licensing,
embedded and non-embedded (i.e., standard) licensing, exclusive and non-exclusive
licensing, and cross licensing agreements.
We control for possible industry effects by constructing dummies for the three
largest industries in our sample. We include an industry dummy for chemicals and
allied products (129 agreements), instruments and related products (30 agreements),
and electrical and electronic equipments (18 agreements). The default “industry”
refers to the remaining 51 agreements that are scattered across 13 different industries.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and Table 2 depicts the correlation matrix
for the variables in this study. Correlation is very low for most variables and only
moderate (50.45) for some industry variables, well below the suggested cut-off point
of 0.70 (Cohen et al., 2002) indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. In
addition, variance inflated factors (VIF) were calculated by running “artificial” OLS
regressions between each independent variable as the “dependent” variable and the
remaining independent variables as suggested by Maddala (2000).7 As all VIF values
are smaller than 2, this indicates that there is no multicollinearity between the
variables.8
Table 3 provides the results for the stepwise logit analysis, where industry and
pair-related variables are added to the analysis. An alternative procedure, where each
step remains in the analysis as the other variables are added, generated similar results.
6An alternative technology overlap measure, based on the number of patent classes, at the three digit
level, that licensors and licensees share divided by the total number of patent classes of both
companies, generated similar results.
7Variance Inflation Factors (VIFj) for each such regression are calculated as: VIFj ¼ 1=ð1 R2j Þ,
where R2j is the R
2 of the artificial regression with the j-th independent variable as a “dependent”
variable.
8Given the moderate level of correlation between the industry variables, we also ran the regressions
without industry dummies which generated similar results as those presented in Table 2.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (means, sd, minimum, median, and maximum) for all
variables (N¼ 228)
Variables Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Form of licensing agreement 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00
Level of technological sophistication 7.89 5.28 0.20 8.60 14.70
Regime of appropriability 50.86 7.59 32.50 53.57 70.69
Size differential 1.76 4.37 10.10 1.94 8.89
Innovative differential 0.01 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.68
Market overlap 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
Technological overlap 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00
Time 5.21 2.46 1.00 5.00 10.00
Average experience 1.22 1.17 0.69 1.10 3.95
Chemicals and allied products 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Instruments and related products 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 2 Bivariate correlations for all variables, N¼ 228
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Form of licensing agreement
2 Level of technological
sophistication
0.21
3 Regime of appropriability 0.27 0.21
4 Size differential 0.190.080.07
5 Innovative differential 0.01 0.01 0.120.10
6 Market overlap 0.13 0.23 0.080.110.06
7 Technological overlap 0.14 0.14 0.100.000.04 0.06
8 Time 0.080.170.11 0.040.030.21 0.07
9 Average experience 0.11 0.250.010.12 0.06 0.04 0.37 0.11
10 Chemicals and allied
products
0.00 0.380.020.090.03 0.23 0.180.03 0.21
11 Instruments and related
products
0.030.04 0.10 0.03 0.090.110.130.070.130.33
12 Electrical and electronic
equipment
0.010.180.05 0.030.020.070.02 0.030.070.440.11
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Given the rather unambiguous nature of the results, we will only discuss the results
for the full model (model 4). Compared with the other models, the full model has the
expected lowest log-likelihood value and it generates a very significant improvement
(P50.001) over the base model (model 1) and models 2 and 3.
Turning to the hypotheses testing, we find some clear results for the industry-
related hypotheses and some mixed findings for the pair-level hypotheses. Consistent
with Hypothesis 1, the higher the level of technological sophistication of industries,
in terms of R&D intensity, the more companies operating in these industries prefer
partnership-embedded licensing agreements, where technology transfer is part of a
broader partnership, to standard exclusive licensing agreements. Also, as suggested
by Hypothesis 2, the more companies operate in an industry environment where
secrecy is an important dimension of the protection of their innovations and
technology, the more they prefer to embed their technology transfer to other
companies in a partnership rather than arrange for technology transfer through
standard licensing contacts.
The firm or pair level effects on the preference for licensing agreements indicate
that only the size differential in pairs of companies seems to have a significant impact
Table 3 Estimation results of binomial logit model predicting the preference of firms for form
of licensing agreement (partnership-embedded licensing or standard licensing agreement)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.23** (0.47) 2.48* (1.16) 1.08* (0.50) 2.34y (1.21)
Level of technological
sophistication
0.07y (0.03) 0.07y (0.04)
Regime of appropriability 0.06** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02)
Size differential 0.10** (0.04) 0.10** (0.04)
Innovative differential 0.15 (1.76) 0.84 (1.82)
Market overlap 0.86 (0.59) 0.61 (0.60)
Technological overlap 0.95y (0.55) 0.80 (0.57)
Time 0.09 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07)
Average experience 0.25y (0.13) 0.19 (0.14) 0.14 (0.15) 0.93 (0.15)
Chemicals and allied products 0.21 (0.38) 0.43 (0.42) 0.46 (0.40) 0.64 (0.44)
Instruments and related products 0.29 (0.60) 0.58 (0.62) 0.23 (0.61) 0.52 (0.63)
Electrical and electronic
equipment
0.14 (0.51) 0.14 (0.52) 0.24 (0.52) 0.23 (0.53)
N 228 228 228 228
- Log likelihood 134.5065 124.9702 127.5203 119.7334
Standard errors in parentheses.
yP50.10; *P50.05; **P50.01.
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on the preference of these companies. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the larger the
size differentials between partners, when licensors are smaller than their licensees,
companies prefer to transfer technology through a licensing agreement that is part of
a wider partnership that covers multiple elements of the value chain. However, the
other hypotheses did not generate the expected results. We expected that when
licensors are more innovative than their licensees, they would be inclined to protect
their technology transfer by means of additional control, beyond the protection
offered by a contract, through a broader partnership (Hypothesis 4). Our results
indicate that neither the innovative differential between partners nor the innovative
supremacy of the licensor has an effect on the preference for a particular form of
licensing. Also, the degree to which partners are direct competitors as they are
operating in similar markets (Hypothesis 5a) or the degree to which their
technologies are somewhat similar (Hypothesis 5b) appear to have no impact on
the preference for partnership-embedded licensing. Both market overlap and
technological overlap have the expected positive sign and technological overlap is
even marginally significant in model 3, but we find no significant results in the full
model (model 4).
The control variables, time, average experience of partners with a wider range of
licensing agreements, and the industry dummies have no effect on the preference for
particular forms of licensing. Given some suggestions on the possible effect of the
regime of appropriability on the licensing strategy of different companies (Anand
and Khanna, 2000), we considered a number of interaction effects of the regime of
appropriability with the size of licensors, the innovativeness of licensors, the market
overlap of partners and their technological overlap. We also considered the
interaction of these variables with experience, because inexperienced firms may be
less selective in their choice of partners than more experienced firms. However, these
interaction effects turned out to be not significant.
It is also useful to examine marginal effects that show the change in predicted
probability associated with changes in the explanatory variables (Greene, 2003).
These marginal effects are shown in Table 4. An examination of the marginal effects
indicates the direction of the influence of the explanatory variables on the preference
of companies for either standard licensing agreements or broader partnership-
embedded licensing agreements, as well as their level of significance. The results show
that a 1-point increase of the level of technological sophistication increases the
probability of broader partnership-embedded licensing agreement with 0.01.
Furthermore, an increase in the effectiveness of secrecy increases the probability of
broader partnership-embedded licensing agreement with 0.01. The result for the size
differential in pairs of companies is also interesting. An increase in the size difference
between partners has a negative effect on the probability of broader partnership-
embedded licensing agreement. This indicates that when the licensor is smaller than
the licensee, the licensor prefers to transfer technology through a licensing agreement
that is part of a wider partnership that covers multiple elements of the value chain.
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Hence, the evidence of these marginal effects suggests that firms prefer broader
partnership-embedded licensing agreements with increasing technological sophisti-
cation, increasing importance of secrecy, and the smaller the licensor is compared to
its licensee.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Our findings clearly indicate that industry-specific conditions, both in terms of
the level of technological sophistication and the regimes of appropriability, have an
effect on the preference of companies for technology transfer through either standard
licensing contracts or through partnership-embedded licensing. The more industries
are characterized as technologically sophisticated and R&D intensive, the higher
the preference for partnership-embedded licensing. Such industries where hyper-
competition (D’Aveni, 1995), with a combination of product differentiation,
large R&D efforts, speedy innovation, and flexibility, affect the competitive
positioning of companies are also those sectors where we witness a growth in the
number of partnerships (Dussauge and Garette, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002). Inter-firm
partnerships in these technologically sophisticated industries combine multiple
technologies of partners that can actually overarch different fields of technology,
where companies jointly develop new technologies and new products and processes.
Table 4 Marginal effects on the probability that firms prefer a partnership-embedded
licensing agreement or a standard licensing agreement
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.25** (0.09) 0.49* (0.24) 0.21* (0.09) 0.45y (0.24)
Level of technological sophistication 0.01y (0.02) 0.01y (0.01)
Regime of appropriability 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Size differential 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Innovative differential 0.03 (0.35) 0.16 (0.35)
Market overlap 0.14y (0.08) 0.11 (0.09)
Technological overlap 0.16* (0.07) 0.13 (0.81)
Time 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Average experience 0.05y (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Chemicals and allied products 0.04 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08)
Instruments and related products 0.06 (0.13) 0.13 (0.15) 0.05 (0.13) 0.11 (0.14)
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.30 (0.11) 0.03 (0.12) 0.05 (0.11) 0.05 (0.11)
Standard errors in parentheses.
yP50.10; *P50.05; **P5 0.01.
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The sharing of technological competences and learning with and from partners are
the main goals of partnerships in these industries (Hagedoorn, 2002). As the transfer
of multiple and complex technologies is less enhanced by standard licensing
agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000), we submit that in technologically
sophisticated industries, where companies have already built up considerable
experience with partnerships, licensing of complex technologies is embedded in
partnerships to facilitate the collaboration and transfer of technology from one
company to the other.
Industries characterized as technologically less sophisticated represent more
homogeneous markets with less product differentiation and less emphasis on
continuous innovation. It is also in these industries that we find fewer partner-
ships and less partnership experience of individual companies (Dussauge and
Garette, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002) with more single technology transfer (Anand and
Khanna, 2000). As such the need for companies to embed their technology transfer in
broader partnerships seems limited. In these industries, technology transfer is also
less geared towards complex, multiple technology sourcing, where the tacit nature of
knowledge would require a more extended cooperation between licensor
and licensee.
When we consider the regime of appropriability of industries, in terms of the
degree to which companies use secrecy to protect their innovative input and output
(Cohen et al., 2000), our research indicates some interesting findings. When tacit
knowledge and confidentiality become important social mechanisms to protect
innovation and technological knowledge in industries, the relevance of partnership-
embedded technology transfer also increases. Standard licensing contracts are clearly
less relational in nature than partnerships (Eisenberg, 2000; Hagedoorn and Hesen,
2007) but even licensing agreements are in principle not 100% complete and as such
second-order diffusion (Hill, 1992) remains a risk even in exclusive licensing
agreements. Partnership-embedded licensing does offer partners the possibility to
create more elaborate cooperation than through a standard licensing contract, yet it
also gives them the opportunity to closely monitor technology transfer and partly
control their relationship through a partnership.
Looking at the company and pair effects on the preference for standard licensing
contracts or partnership-embedded licensing, it appears that the size differential
between partners engaging in technology transfer is the only factor that is relevant.
Neither the difference in innovative capabilities nor the conflicting interests through
overlap in product market combinations or similar technology sourcing seem to be
relevant. It is important to note that the form of licensing that this study analyses
refers to technology transfer in which companies made an agreement where the
technology to be transferred is restricted to one licensee who can use it for a specific
geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific application. This
suggests that when licensors are more innovative than their licensees, or when both
companies operate in similar markets and depend on similar technologies,
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companies are probably confident that licensing agreements, regardless of some
contractual incompleteness, provide ample safeguards against opportunistic
behaviour and second-order diffusion (Caves et al., 1983; Hill, 1992).
Partnership-specific effects are relevant when we consider size differential between
companies that engage in technology transfer through licensing. As suggested by our
findings, the more partners differ in size, the higher the likelihood that they prefer
partnership-embedded licensing agreements to standard licensing contracts. More
specifically, when the licensor is the smaller partner, we see that a partnership-
embedded licensing agreement is the preferred mode of technology transfer. By
definition, the licensor holds the property rights on the technology to be transferred
and it probably has the relevant experience and knowledge about how to use the
technology, which gives it an information advantage (Caves et al., 1983). However, as
indicated in research by Kolmer and Dowling (2004), compared to larger companies,
small firms are more inclined, or forced due to lack of financial resources or
complementary assets, to license core technologies to other companies. Smaller
companies are also engaged in fewer technologies than large companies that tend to
be more multi-technology and multidivisional in nature (Freeman and Soete, 1997;
Scherer, 1980). This implies that when smaller companies act as licensors it is likely
that their technology transfer refers to an activity that is relatively crucial for these
companies as their pool of technologies from which to transfer a specific technology
is limited (Arora et al., 2001). Even though exclusive licensing contracts limit
the scope of the application by the licensee, smaller licensors are limited in their
abilities to counter the risk of impacted information and opportunism on part of the
licensees. All of this suggests that when licensors are confronted with larger
licensing partners, smaller licensors prefer to organize their technology transfer
through partnership-embedded licensing agreements that enable them to monitor
their partner through a broader partnership set-up over an extended period of time
than through a single licensing contract.
In this context, we can also briefly discuss some interesting legal aspects of the
preference of companies for partnership-embedded licensing. Given the legally
problematic status of pre-contractual liability regarding intellectual property due to
the early disclosure of technical information, i.e., prior to the actual technology
transfer under a licensing agreement, companies might prefer to engage in
partnership-embedded licensing agreements to better monitor and control the
agreement from the early start. However, as explained by Merges (2006), when the
technology to be transferred is protected by patents, companies are already well-
protected by law. Assuming that most of the licensing agreements in our sample are
backed by patents, this could explain why companies that engage in technology
transfer with companies in similar markets, with technologically overlapping
partners, and with less innovative partners are already well-protected and do not
have to rely on embedded licensing agreements per se. When companies are smaller
than their partners, they prefer partnership-embedded licensing which could indicate
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that smaller companies might fear that litigation of larger companies is troublesome
and time-consuming. If, the licensing agreement would be violated by the larger
partner, then monitoring the technology transfer through a partnership-embedded
licensing agreement will give more useful information about how, where and to what
extent the license is implemented by the partner and which activities take place
outside the parameters set by the agreement.
Although, the above suggests a number of interesting findings that clarify under
which conditions companies prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard
licensing contract, our research still leaves quite a number of questions unanswered
and additional research is required. As already indicated in Section 1, this is, to the
best of our knowledge, the very first attempt to analyse the choices that companies
make when they consider technology transfer through a standard licensing contract
or through a more extended partnership. A number of subjects that warrant further
research come to mind. First, our research is based on a limited sample of licensing
agreements and further research on an extended sample with a larger number of
companies in a more multi-sectoral and international setting will enable us to look at
research questions from an international perspective while broadening the picture to
a broader range of industries. Second, our data are restricted to a limited number of
publicly announced agreements with some information on the content of the
agreement. Obviously, we need more information on the motives of firms to arrive at
a more complete understanding of the alternative options that they consider. Survey
research and case studies can generate further insight into the considerations of
companies, asking a much broader set of questions about the motives to engage in
technology transfer and its organizational and contractual setting than is possible
through database research. Third, a relatively unknown territory for future empirical
research is found in the interaction of the legal set-up of various forms of technology
transfer, their organizational setting, and the strategic implications of the choices that
companies make when they transfer technology to other companies. In addition,
future research could consider the actual learning effect for companies through these
different forms of licensing. Obviously, these topics for future research also indicate
the limitations to our current contribution, in terms of the relatively small sample for
US companies, largely limited to a small number of industries, while we addressed
only a small number of research questions. Given the exploratory nature of our
contribution, we hope that despite some limitations, our work has explored a
number of interesting subjects that lay out some of the groundwork for future
studies.
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